Insurance-markets Equilibrium with Sequential

Non-convex Market-Sector and Divisible Informal-Sector

Labor Supply by Vasilev, Aleksandar
Volume III, Issue 2(5), Winter 2017
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14505/jmef.v3.2(5).03
Insurance-markets Equilibrium with Sequential
Non-convex Market-Sector and Divisible Informal-Sector
Labor Supply
Aleksandar Vasilev
Independent Researcher
alvasilev@yahoo.com
Abstract. This paper describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an
economy with non-convex market-sector employment and informal sector work. In
contrast to Vasilev 2016a, the discrete-continuous labor supply decision in this paper
is a sequential one, and instead of home production, we focus on informal activity.
The presence of non-convexity requires that an insurance market for market-sector
employment be put in operation to achieve market completeness. In addition, given
that the labor choice for market work and informal-sector hours is made in succes-
sion, the insurance market for market employment needs to close before the labor
supply choice in the grey economy is made. This timing is reminiscent of the results
obtained in Vasilev 2016b) and also a direct consequence of the sequential nature of
the discrete-continuous sectoral labor supply decision.
Keywords: Indivisible labour, Lotteries, Discrete-continuous mix, Informal econ-
omy, Insurance.
JEL Classification Codes: E1, J22, J46.
1. Introduction and Motivation
The purpose of this paper is to explore the problem of non-convex labor supply
decision in an economy with both discrete and continuous labor decisions. The nov-
elty relative to those studies is that the earlier setups (Vasilev 2016a,b) were dealing
with private-public sector and full-time work vs. overtime, respectively, while here
the focus is on the market vs. unofficial work margin. The partucular focus in this
paper is on the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an economy with non-
convex market-sector employment and informal sector work. In contrast to Vasilev
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Vasilev 2016a, the discrete-continuous labor supply decision in this paper is a sequen-
tial one, and instead of home production, we focus on informal activity. The presence
of non-convexity requires that an insurance market for market-sector employment be
put in operation to achieve market completeness. In addition, given that the labor
choice for market work and informal-sector hours is made in succession, the insurance
market for market employment needs to close before the labor supply choice in the
grey economy is made. This timing is reminiscent of the results obtained in Vasilev
Vasilev 2016b and also a direct consequence of the sequential nature of the discrete-
continuous sectoral labor supply decision.
2. Model Setup
The basis of the model is the setup described in Vasilev 2017, but extended to
incorporate an institution selling unemployment insurance. The economy is static,
there is no physical capital, and agents face a sequential discrete-continuous labor
supply decision. There is a large number of identical one-member households, in-
dexed by i and distributed uniformly on the [0, 1] interval. In the exposition below,
we will use small case letters to denote individual variables and suppress the index i
to save on notation.
2.1 Description of the model
Each one-member household maximizes the following utility function:
U(c, l) = ln c+ α ln l, (1)
where
• c denotes consumption of market output,
• l is the leisure enjoyed by each individual household,
• α > 0 is the relative weight attached to utility of leisure.
Each household is endowed with a time endowment of unity, which can be split
between hous worked in either the official sector, hm, hours worked in the informal
economy (“black market”), hb, and leisure l, so that
hm + hb + l = 1 (2)
The households make a sequential labor supply choice: The first is whether to work
full-time in the market sector, or not at all. In other words,
hm ∈ {0; h¯}.
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Conditional on not working in the market sector, a household may decide to go and
work in the grey sector, where it can supply any number of hours, i.e.
hb ∈ [0, 1].
That is, the first labor choice is indivisible, while the second is divisible. Also, it will
be assumed that
hb = 0
whenever
hm = h¯,
or a household employed full-time in the market sector would choose not to supply
any hours in the grey economy. This assumption is put in place to guarantee that
each worker can only participate in one of the production sectors. Next, the hourly
wage rate in the official (“market”) sector and the implicit rate in the informal econ-
omy (“black market”) sectors are denoted by wm and wb, respectively. Finally, the
households own the firm in the market economy, and are entitled an equal share of
the profit (pi).
The problem faced by a household that decides to work full-time in the market sector
is then to set
hm = h¯
and enjoy
Um = ln(wmh¯+ pi) + α ln(1− h¯), (3)
while a household that decides not to work in the market sector chooses
hb ∈ [0, 1]
to maximize its utility function
max
hb
U b = ln(wbhb + pi) + α ln(1− hb). (4)
The optimal labor choice in the grey economy is then characterized by the following
first-order condition:
wb
wbhb + pi
=
α
1− hb , (5)
or
hb =
wb − αpi
(1 + α)wb
(6)
That is, optimal choice of hours worked in the informal economy is a function of both
the wage and profit rate in the official sector, which the household takes as given.
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2.2 Stand-in firm: market sector
There is a representative firm in the model economy, which operates in the mar-
ket sector. It produces a homogeneous final product using a production function that
requires labor Hm as the only input. For simplicity, output price will be normalized
to unity. The production function f(Hm) features decreasing returns to scale and
satisfies the following conditions:
f ′(Hm) > 0,
f ′′(Hm) < 0,
f ′(0) =∞,
f ′(h¯) = 0.
The representative firm acts competitively by taking the wage rate wm as given,
and chooses Hm to maximize profit:
pi = f(Hm)− wmHm s.t. 0 ≤ Hm ≤ h¯. (7)
In equilibrium, there will be positive profit, which follows from the assumptions im-
posed on the production function.
2.3 Stand-in firm: unofficial sector
Each worker in the unofficial sector has access to an individual concave produc-
tion function (“backyard technology”) that uses only labor, g(hb), where
g′(hb) > 0,
g′′(hb) < 0,
g′(0) =∞,
g′(1) = 0.
Each firm in the unofficial sector will then hire labor hb to maximize static
profit
max
hb
g(hb)− wbhb s.t. 0 ≤ hb ≤ 1. (8)
With free entry, profits in the sector equal to zero, hence the implicit wage wb in the
unofficial sector equals the average product of labor, i.e.
wb =
g(hb)
hb
. (9)
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3. Insurance Market: Market-sector Insurance Company
An alternative way to represent the labor selection arrangement in the market
sector is to regard workers as participants in a lottery with the proportion employed
equal to the probability of being selected for work. Therefore, we can introduce in-
surance markets, and allow households to buy insurance, which would allow them
to equalize the actual income received independent of the employment status in the
market sector. More specifically, the structure of the insurance industry is as fol-
lows: there is one representative insurance company for market sector employment,
which services all households and maximizes profit. It receives revenue if a household
is working in the market sector and makes payment if it is not. At the beginning
of the period, the households decide if and how much insurance to buy against the
probability of being chosen for market-sector work. Insurance costs qm per unit, and
provides one unit of income if the household is not employed in the market sector.
Thus, household will also choose the quantity of insurance to purchase bm; we can
think of insurance as bonds that pay out only in case the household is not chosen for
work in the official economy. Then, the company closes, and the households not se-
lected for official-sector work, choose how many hours to supply in the informal sector.
The amount of insurance sold by the insurance company is a solution to the
following problem: Taking qm(i) as given, bm(i) solves
max
bm(i)
λm(i)qm(i)bm(i)− [1− λm(i)]bm(i) (10)
with free entry profits are zero, hence
λm(i)qm(i)bm(i)− [1− λm(i)]bm(i) = 0, (11)
hence the insurance market for each household clears.
4. Decentalized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) with lotteries
4.1 Definition of the DCE with lotteries
A competitive Equilibrium with Lotteries for this economy is a list
(cm(i), cb(i), λm(i), hb(i), p, w
m, wb, pi) (12)
such that the following conditions are fulfilled.
1. Consumers maximization condition. Taking prices wm, wb, pi as given, for
each i, the sequence
σ = (cm(i), cb(i), λm(i), hb(i)) (13)
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solves the maximization problem
max
σ∈Σ
λm(i) ln cm(i) + (1− λm(i)) ln cb(i) + λm(i)α ln(1− h¯) +
+(1− λm(i))α ln(1− hb(i)) (14)
s.t
λm(i)cm(i) + (1− λm(i))cb(i) =
= λm(i)wmh¯+ (1− λm(i))wbhb(i) + pi, (15)
with
cm(i) ≥ 0, cb(i) ≥ 0, 0 < λm(i) < 1, ∀i, (16)
where Σ is the constraint defined by relations (15)-(16).
2. Market-sector firm maximization condition. Taking prices wm, wb, pi as
given,
max
H¯m≥0
F (H¯m)− wmH¯m. (17)
3. Informal-sector firm maximization condition. Taking prices wm, wb, pi as
given,
max
hb(i)≥0
g(hb(i))− wbhb(i) s.t g(hb(i))− wbhb(i) = 0, ∀i. (18)
4. Market-clearing condition: We have∫
i
λm(i)h¯di = H¯m, (19)∫
i
{λm(i)cm(i) + (1− λm(i))cb(i)}di = F (H¯m) +
∫
i
(1− λm(i))g(hb(i))di, (20)
where the last equation describes clearing in the goods market. Note that in
line with national income accounting, output from informal activity also counts
towards total gross domestic product.
4.2 Characterizing the DCE
The household’s problem is as follows:
L = max
σ∈Σ
λm(i) ln cm(i) + (1− λm(i)) ln cb(i) + λm(i)α ln(1− h¯) +
(1− λm(i))α ln(1− hb(i))− µ[λm(i)cm(i) + (1− λm(i))cb(i) +
−λm(i)wmh¯− (1− λm(i))wbhb(i)− pi], (21)
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where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier in front of the households’ budget constraint.
The first-order optimality conditions are as follows:
cm(i) :
1
cm(i)
= µ, ∀i, (22)
cb(i) :
1
cb(i)
= µ, ∀i. (23)
It follows that
c = cm(i) = cb(i) = 1/µ, ∀i. (24)
We simplify the Lagrangian by suppressing all consumption superscripts and i nota-
tion in the derivations to follow
hb(i) :
α
1− hb(i) = µw
b, ∀i, (25)
λm(i) : α[ln(1− h¯)− ln(1− hb(i))] = µ[wbhb(i)− wmh¯], ∀i. (26)
The former condition states that the marginal rate of substitution between labor in
the informal sector and consumption equals the implicit sector in the black market.
The latter says that the difference from enjoying leisure (given that consumption
utility has been equilizes across states equals the difference in the labor income, mul-
tiplied by the shadow price of consumption (i.e. expressed in consumption utility
terms). This implicitly characterizes optimal market sector participation rate λm.
Note that it is optimal from the benevolent planner/government point of view to
choose randomly λm and to introduce uncertainty. With randomization, choice sets
are convexified, and thus market completeness is achieved. Now we extend the com-
modity space to include insurance markets explicitly.
5. Decentralized Competitive Equilibrium (DCE) with insurance markets
5.1 Definition of the DCE with insurance markets
A competitive Equilibrium with Lotteries and insurance markets for this
economy is a list
(cm(i), cb(i), λm(i), bm(i), qm(i), hb(i), p, w
m, wb, pi), (27)
such that the following conditions are fulfilled.
1. Consumers maximization condition. Taking prices p, wm, wb, pi as given,
for each i, the sequence
σ = (cm(i), cb(i), λm(i), hb(i)) (28)
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solves the maximization problem
max
σ∈Σ
λm(i)[ln cm(i) + α ln(1− h¯)] + (1− λm(i))[ln cb(i) + α ln(1− hb(i))] (29)
s.t
pcm(i) + bm(i)qm(i) = wmh¯+ pi (30)
pcb(i) = bm(i) + wbhb(i) + pi (31)
cm(i) ≥ 0, cb(i) ≥ 0, 0 < λm(i) < 1,∀i (32)
or
pcm(i) + pqm(i)cb(i) = wmh¯+ qm(i)wbhb(i) + (1 + pi)qm(i) (33)
where Σ is the constraint defined by the above relations.
2. Market-sector firm maximization condition. Taking prices wm, wb, pi as
given,
max
H¯m≥0
F (H¯m)− wmH¯m. (34)
3. Informal-sector firm maximization condition. Taking prices wm, wb, pi as
given, ∀i
max
hb(i)≥0
g(hb(i))− wbhb(i) s.t g(hb(i))− wbhb(i) = 0. (35)
4. Insurance-company Taking gm(i) as given, bm(i) solves
max
bm(i)
λm(i)qm(i)bm(i)− (1− λm(i))bm(i) (36)
with free entry profits are zero, hence
λm(i)qm(i)bm(i)− (1− λm(i))bm(i) = 0. (37)
This implicitly clears the insurance market for each individual in the market
sector.
5. Market-clearing condition: We have∫
i
λm(i)h¯di = H¯m, (38)∫
i
{λm(i)cm(i) + (1− λm(i))cb(i)}di = F (H¯m) +
∫
i
(1− λm(i))g(hb(i))di. (39)
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5.2 Characterization of the DCE with insurance markets
L = max
σ∈Σ
λm(i){ln cm(i) + α ln(1− h¯) + (1− λm(i))[ln cb(i) + α ln(1− hb(i))}+
−µ[pcm(i) + pqm(i)cb(i)− wmh¯− qm(i)wbhb(i)− (1 + pi)qm(i)] (40)
Normalize p = 1.
cm(i) :
λm(i)
cm(i)
= pµ, ∀i, (41)
cb(i) :
(1− λm(i))
cb(i)
= pqm(i)µ, ∀i. (42)
Optimal λm (λm(i) = λm, ∀i) is implicitly characterized by the zero-profit condition
from the market-sector insurance company:
λm
1− λm =
1
qm
, (43)
which implies that the price of the insurance equals the ratio of probabilities of the
two events (“the odds ratio”). Combining this with the other optimality condition,
we obtain that households buy full insurance to equalize consumption,
cm = cb, ∀i.
That is, in the presence of uncertainty, we need insurance companies to achieve mar-
ket completeness.
6. Conclusions
This paper describes the lottery- and insurance-market equilibrium in an econ-
omy with non-convex market-sector employment and informal sector work. The pres-
ence of non-convexity requires that an insurance market for market-sector employ-
ment be put in operation to achieve market completeness. In addition, the insurance
market for market employment needs to close before the labor supply choice in the
grey economy is made. This timing of the insurance-market operation is a direct
consequence of the sequential nature of the discrete-continuous labor supply decision.
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